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Abstract 
The traditionally coercive and state-controlled governance of protected areas for 
nature conservation in developing countries has in many cases undergone change in 
the context of widespread decentralization and liberalization. This article examines an 
emerging “mixed” (coercive, community- and market-oriented) conservation 
approach and its effects on state power through a case study on forest protection in the 
central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. The findings suggest that imperfect 
decentralization and partial liberalization resulted in changed forms, rather than 
uniform loss, of state power. A forest co-management program paradoxically 
strengthened local capacity and influence of the Forest Department, which generally 
maintained its territorial and knowledge-based control over forests and timber 
management. Furthermore, deregulation and reregulation enabled the state to 
withdraw from uneconomic activities but also implied reduced place-based control of 
non-timber forest products. Generally, the new policies and programs contributed to 
the separation of livelihoods and forests in Madhya Pradesh. The article concludes 
that regulatory, community- and market-based initiatives would need to be better 
coordinated to lead to more effective nature conservation and positive livelihood 
outcomes.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Forest reserves, wildlife sanctuaries, national parks and other protected areas in 
developing countries have not only served the conservation of nature but also political 
and economic goals of (post-)colonial states and other powerful actors (Adams, 2001; 
Vandergeest & Peluso, 1995; Neumann, 1998). Typically, protected areas were 
established coercively and their management was top-down involving “fences and 
fines” set and enforced by (colonial) state authorities. This “fortress conservation” 
sought to exclude local populations who were seen as disturbances to nature.  
A massive expansion of protected areas coincided with the emergence of modern, 
transnational environmentalism in the 1970s (Brockington et al., 2008; Zimmerer, 
2006). Since the 1980s, furthermore, community-oriented conservation strategies 
have become popular (Brosius et al., 2005; Adams & Hutton, 2007; Few, 2000). 
These seek to involve local communities in the (joint) management of natural 
resources or, at least, compensate them for the imposed restrictions on resource use. 
At the same time, however, most developing countries started and strengthened 
policies of (neo-) liberalization, deregulation and privatization (Harvey, 2005), and 
the related neoliberal principles of economic rationality and market orientation 
affected in some cases conservation policies (Neumann, 1995). 
However, the relationship between community-based and market-oriented strategies 
of nature conservation in protected areas has rarely been thematized in academic 
studies (exceptions include Neumann, 1995; Turner, 2004; Büscher, 2010). This paper 
aims to fill this gap in the literature through a case study on forest protection in the 
central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh and attempts to examine how state control 
over forests and forest resources was altered through decentralized and liberalized 
forms of governance. Thereby, we identify tensions and contradictions of an emerging 
“mixed” (coercive, community- and market-oriented) conservation approach and we 
seek to assess its interrelated political, environmental and socioeconomic implications 
in the case of Madhya Pradesh. We expect our findings to have resonance beyond 
India, as similar mixed conservation approaches are likely to exist elsewhere. Taking 
a cue from Robbins (2003), furthermore, the article connects elements from political 
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ecology and political geography and is also intended to make a conceptual 
contribution to geographical literature. 
In terms of methodology, this paper draws upon data from 34 semi-structured key 
informant interviews conducted in 2005 and 2006 with forest officers of different 
rank, other policy-makers, representatives of local forest user organizations, and 
forest/livelihood experts from civil society and academia in Madhya Pradesh. This 
information was triangulated with data from three qualitative village studies on forest-
dependent livelihoods conducted in 2005 and 2006 in southern and eastern parts of 
Madhya Pradesh (Betul and Shahdol districts) and complemented with information 
from three additional villages studies (two in Panna, northern Madhya Pradesh, and 
one in Betul district) that did not specifically focus on forest issues. Furthermore, we 
analyzed relevant secondary literature and various official and project documents. 
After this introduction, we expand on the literature on political ecology and 
geography of protected areas by considering relevant technologies of power related to 
state control, decentralization and liberalization. Then, we briefly examine the 
establishment of direct, territorial state control over forests in Madhya Pradesh in the 
colonial period and its reinforcement through environmentalist legislation in the 
1970s and 1980s. The subsequent two sections describe the recent policy shifts in 
Madhya Pradesh’s forest sector, including the initiatives of decentralization of forest 
control and the partial liberalization of the timber and non-timber sectors. These 
policies and related practices are analyzed for their effects on the reconfiguration and 
differentiation of state control, as well as for their environmental and livelihood 
implications. In the concluding section, we summarize the findings regarding the 
complex effects of liberalization and decentralization on state control, forest 
environments and livelihoods and hint at some theoretical and policy implications. 
A POLITICAL ECOLOGY/GEOGRAPHY OF FOREST PROTECTION 
There have been a growing number of political ecology studies on nature conservation 
and protected areas (particularly national parks in Africa) over the past 10-15 years 
(for overviews see Adams & Hutton, 2007; Robbins, 2004; Neumann, 2005; 
Campbell et al., 2008). These studies have problematized the social constructiveness 
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of nature and related environmental narratives or myths (e.g., Cronon, 1995; see also 
Forsyth, 2003), the displacement and exclusion of local people from national parks 
(e.g., Brockington, 2002), the disruption of livelihoods due to imposed restrictions of 
resource use (e.g., West & Brechin, 1991; Ghimire, 1991; Sodhi et al., 2007) and 
resulting conflicts between state authorities and local communities (e.g., Kull, 2002; 
Neumann, 1998).  
In political geography, protected areas have been a less popular theme. Studies 
focused mostly on (trans-) boundary issues (Fall, 2003; Dilsaver & Wyckoff, 2005; 
Büscher, 2010) or national parks as symbolic landscapes of national identity 
(Schwartz, 2006). However, insights from political geography on the nature of state 
control, decentralization and (neo-) liberalization, as well as related concepts of state 
power commonly used in political geography, can usefully complement the political 
ecology literature on conservation and control.  
This section therefore brings together diverse bodies of literature from political 
ecology and political geography as they are relevant for, and relate to, the protection 
of forests, in particular the literatures on: the social construction of nature; 
territoriality and biopower; decentralized, participatory natural resource management; 
and the (neo-) liberalization of nature. 
Protected Areas as Materially and Socially Constructed Landscapes 
Political ecologists have argued that “nature”, although having its own biophysical 
reality and agency, is identified, conceptualized and represented through social and 
political processes (Forsyth, 2003; Peet & Watts, 2004). The idea (or “social 
construction”) of nature on which the creation of national parks has commonly been 
based, for instance, is that of “wilderness” or “pristine nature”, an area isolated from 
human influence (Neumann, 1998; Cronon, 1995). Political ecologists have viewed 
this idea as problematic because it implies a human-nature dichotomy and ignores 
activities of local communities in creating “natural” landscapes on sites that were 
subsequently demarcated as national parks (Neumann, 2005). Even for protected areas 
that are not envisioned as “pristine nature”, states attempt to create particular 
landscapes according to imagined ideals. In this way, the boundary between the 
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discursive image of a landscape and its material reality becomes blurred: “The 
imagined forest becomes the real one, and vice versa, through the enforcement of 
[social] constructs by powerful people over time” (Robbins, 2004: 110). 
The material production of imagined landscapes (or “anthropogenic nature” [Kull, 
2002]) necessitates the spatial exclusion of local people or restrictions on their 
practices that are deemed to disturb and encroach on nature (Fairhead & Leach, 1996; 
Campbell, 2002). The desired spatial separation of human activities and protected 
areas is then aided by the instruments of cartography (Adams & Hutton, 2007) and its 
modern-day successor, geographical information systems (Clapp, 2004). Mapping of 
protected forests precedes the installation of fences on the ground.  
Protected Areas and Technologies of Power  
Mapping is closely related to an important technique of governing; i.e., creating 
“territories” or bounded spaces that are protected “by excluding some activities and 
by including those [activities] which will enhance [what is to be protected]” (Cox, 
2002: 3). While political ecologists have rightly argued that the demarcation of 
protected areas usually followed geometric or political rather than ecological logics 
(Zimmerer, 2000), this paper is more concerned with territoriality as a (state) strategy 
to exert power over people (Sack, 1986). For instance, Vandergeest & Peluso (1995) 
have identified the spatial demarcation of protected areas (in their case Thailand’s 
forests) as an important process in the development of the modern territorial state. 
While the initial motivation of this internal territorialization was to protect resources, 
“most states later employed the territorial administration to organize surveillance, 
gather information about the population, force them to settle down … and organize 
close control over people’s everyday activities” (Vandergeest & Peluso, 1995: 390). 
Protected territories, then, have played an important role in the formation of modern 
(colonial) states and the expansion of direct state power. Though local people often 
disregarded and resisted new internal boundaries, and overlapping jurisdictions of 
different government departments weakened central state control (Vandergeest & 
Peluso, 1995).  
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Forest management in protected areas entails another modern technology of 
governing, that of “biopolitics” (Foucault, 2004). Through the use of science, modern 
states simplified, classified and measured nature and society in order to make them 
more legible and thus more manageable and malleable (Scott, 1998). For example, 
states in the 19th century used “scientific” forestry to reorganize woodlands into 
territorial production units and to determine unit-specific limits on allowable cutting 
rates with the objective to sustain maximum timber yields over time (which was 
defined as the optimal societal outcome). The application of scientific knowledge to 
protected forest areas implied the regulation of both nature and populations (Adams & 
Hutton, 2007); it tended to overlook, ignore or appropriate the knowledge systems of 
local communities, and so expanded state control (Robbins, 2000).  
Decentralization, Containment and Technologies of the Self 
Have the recent community-oriented approaches to natural resource management 
reversed the trend of expanding state power through territorial and biopolitical nature 
conservation? A review of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) 
in the rural development sector indicates that a majority of projects failed to achieve 
their socioeconomic, environmental and political-emancipatory objectives (Blaikie, 
2006). But CBNRM and co-management in protected areas entail a fundamental 
contradiction additionally (Few, 2000). Unlike in rural development, the primary goal 
of protected areas is not to strengthen local livelihoods but to protect biodiversity or a 
particular natural resource. Consequently, substantive community participation “is 
unlikely to be fostered in a protected-area project initiated externally and on 
biodiversity grounds. In such cases, the agenda for the project has already been set, 
community involvement is effectively limited to consultation and the overarching 
process at work when social issues are addressed is containment, not participation.” 
(Few, 2000: 408; own emphasis). However, even containment does not always go 
smoothly and uncontested; the opening of the planning process can provide local 
actors with political space to influence the decisions of the conservation agencies. 
These processes can also exacerbate tensions and conflicts within communities and 
within the state (and other external agencies) (Few, 2000; see also Mosse, 2001).  
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It has been argued that for CBNRM to become effective, it needs to be scaled up and 
institutionalized into political decentralization that involves a meaningful transfer of 
power to democratically accountable local institutions (Ribot, 2002). Decentralized 
decision-making over protected forests became widespread only in the late 1990s, and 
its modalities and impacts vary between countries (Pierce Colfer & Capistrano, 2005), 
but it generally involves only limited devolution of power (Ribot, 2002) through a 
bureaucratic, standardized approach that restricts flexible adaptation to local 
circumstances (Geiser & Rist, 2009). Nevertheless, decentralization has created new 
political arenas where social interactions between local actors and officials are 
reconstructed and through which conflicting ideas and interests between and within 
communities and the state are expressed (Geiser & Rist, 2009). Therefore, 
decentralization implies a change in the nature and modality of state control, yet 
rarely a simple transfer of power from the state to village “communities”. 
Decentralization of natural resource management can also lead to increased 
environmental awareness and self-restraint among local communities. Agrawal (2005) 
found that local people in the Kumaon hills of northern India have – through 
experiencing and practicing decentralized governance of protected forests – 
developed environmental consciousness. “Environmental subjects” were created over 
time, as joint interests between villagers and the state had been manufactured and 
local people adopted and internalized particular environmental discourses. For the 
purpose of this paper, the validity and generalizability of Agrawal’s empirical account 
are less relevant than his conceptualization of “environmentality” based on Foucault’s 
ideas on governmentality. Thereby environmental self-discipline and self-enforcement 
(i.e., “technologies of the self”) resulting from decentralized governance supplement 
the “technologies of power” (e.g., territoriality, biopower or containment) employed 
by the state (or external conservation agencies).  
Deregulation, Reregulation and Depoliticization 
Most developing countries adopted neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Harvey, 2005). This has also brought about the neoliberalization of nature; i.e., a 
form of environmental governance characterized by deregulation, reregulation and 
public-sector reform (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). Thereby, strategies of nature 
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conservation have generally become affected by the neoliberal principles of economic 
rationality and market orientation (Neumann, 1995). 
In terms of deregulation, states have partially withdrawn from direct interventions in 
protected areas. As many countries reduced their budgets (for nature conservation) in 
the course of economic liberalization, the management of (continuously expanding) 
protected areas, or some of their resources, has increasingly been taken up, or 
transferred to, parastatals, NGOs and private companies (Emerton et al., 2006; Turner, 
2004). Where public-sector institutions remain, there is pressure to render them more 
efficient and competitive through reform (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). 
Yet, deregulation is often linked to reregulation in the sense that state action is 
reoriented toward the creation, facilitation and regulation of markets for 
environmental resources and services (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). For instance, 
natural amenity values of protected areas are commoditized through ecotourism 
projects, which currently represent the most common way to generate state revenue 
through and for conservation (Turner, 2004). In the case of protected forests, other 
instruments to put a market price on environmental services include bio-prospecting 
royalties, water fees to pay for watershed protection, and credits for carbon 
sequestering (Pagiola et al., 2002; Emerton et al. 2006).  
The effect of neoliberal governance of protected areas on state power is similarly 
complex than that of decentralization. While deregulation suggests a loss of direct 
state control over territories and resources at the expense of private actors and civil 
society, the commodification of nature gives the state a new powerful role as 
facilitator and regulator of new markets. This role tends to be of technocratic nature 
and beyond the public realm, thus rendering nature conservation increasingly 
depoliticized (Büscher, 2010). 
DIRECT STATE CONTROL OVER FORESTS IN MADHYA PRADESH 
Madhya Pradesh has the largest area under forests in India; more than 76,000 km2, or 
25% of the geographical area, are covered with open and dense forests, including 
teak, sal and miscellaneous forests. Almost all of these forested parts, plus about 
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17,000 km2 of non-wooded area, are under state ownership and classified “Forest 
Land”. This land is sub-divided into Reserved Forests (c. 62,000 km2, preserved for 
commercial timber production and with very limited and fixed concessions for local 
dwellers) and Protected Forests (c. 31,000 km2, where specified trees and tree species 
are protected, and where provincial governments settle the rules regarding 
concessions to local populations for hunting, grazing and subsistence timber 
extraction) (MPFD, 2010a. Out of these protected forests, about 11,000 km2 have 
been carved out as National Parks and Wildlife Sanctuaries (MPFD, 2010b). Small 
areas are furthermore covered with Village Forests (used for subsistence needs of the 
local community) and Private Forests. The state government is also empowered to 
formulate utilization and management rules for these unclassified forests. 
It is estimated that 1/6th of Madhya Pradesh’s population of 60 million lives within 
five kilometers of a forest and uses some of its resources for subsistence needs and for 
sale (MPFD, 2010a). The reliance on forests is strong among, but not limited to, the 
adivasi (aboriginal, tribal) population that lives mostly in the forested hill ranges.  
(Post-) Colonial Land Acquisitions and Territorializations 
Today’s direct, territorial state control over Forest Land in Madhya Pradesh has its 
roots in the colonial period when forest legislation, a forest bureaucracy and scientific 
forest management were introduced. Legal foundations for state acquisition and 
management of forested land were laid in the 1850s and 1860s. In the Central 
Provinces, which covered a large part of today’s Madhya Pradesh1, the state launched 
territorial claims over large tracts of forests between 1845 and 1860 (Baker, 1993). 
Indeed, the first Reserved Forest in India was established here in Hoshangabad district 
after the colonial government had confiscated the Bori forest from a Korku Chieftain, 
Bhaboot Singh, who was the local tribal leader of the revolt against the British in 
1857 (Baker, 1993). This illustrates the close connections between the creation of 
protected territories and expanding state control in the colonial era. 
In order to make possible the acquisition and management of forest land, the colonial 
government also created a disciplinary state apparatus during the 1860s. In particular, 
it established the central and various provincial forest departments and a separate 
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cadre of forest officers, the Imperial Forest Service (IFS; today standing for Indian 
Forest Service). The forest bureaucracy was hierarchically organized, but lower-tier 
officials were given substantial powers in their territorially defined “beats”, including 
the right to arrest forest offenders without warrant. This rendered the (armed) Forest 
Guard the principal arm of the state in remote areas and for long also the de facto 
police. 
The Indian Forest Act of 1878, which became the basis of the still valid Indian Forest 
Act of 1927, solidified the classification of government forests into Reserved and 
Protected Forests and created an internal territorialization of protected forests to 
facilitate their control and management. Furthermore, previous forest-use rights of 
local communities were downgraded into concessions. In the aftermath of the 1878 
act, the enclosure of forest land accelerated throughout British India despite some 
resistance, and it implied the exclusion local communities from accessing important 
resources they traditionally had been depending on (Gadgil and Guha, 1992). The 
anthropologist Verrier Elwin pointed to the state’s territorial strategies affecting 
adivasis in the Central Provinces of the 1930: “[The tribesman] was ordered to remain 
in one village and not wander from place to place. When he had cattle he was kept in 
a state of continual anxiety of fear they should stray over the [Reserved Forest] 
boundary... At every turn the Forest Laws cut across his live, limiting, frustrating, 
destroying his self-confidence” (Elwin, 1964: 115).  
Another surge in government land acquisitions took place in the post-independence 
era in connection with land reforms and the creation of the state of Madhya Pradesh in 
the 1950s. Large areas of wooded and non-wooded commons that had been under 
formal control of zamindars or princely states were notified as Forest Land. As a 
consequence, many (tribal) people all of a sudden were rendered “forest encroachers”. 
Madhu Sarin commented on this process pointedly: “While zamindari abolition freed 
tenants in the plains from landlord oppression, in hilly forested areas it threw millions 
of forest-dwellers into the clutches of a far more oppressive zamindar – the forest 
department…” (Sarin, 2005). Some of this land was transferred into Revenue Land in 
the 1960s and 1970s, but often without proper forest de-notification. This led to a 
situation where 12,274 km2 “orange areas” (named after their colouring on official 
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land classification maps) became claimed by both the Revenue Department and the 
Forest Department in undivided Madhya Pradesh (Garg, 2005).  
Scientific Forestry and Biopower 
The Forest Department has not only been a disciplinary arm of the state but also the 
agency to introduce and apply “scientific” forest management in India. In the 1850s, 
Dietrich Brandis, a German forester, introduced the method of Working Plans in 
colonial India (Negi, 2001). These guide the harvesting of high-value timber in 
rotating forest “coupes”. In each coupe, trees are felled only once in ten or more years 
so that replanting and regeneration can take place undisturbed in the meantime. Early 
plans allowed some traditional cultivation practices to continue in order to gain local 
acceptance (Negi, 2001; Barton, 2001). When they became implemented throughout 
British India in the late 19th century, however, Working Plans focussed more narrowly 
on the steady and sustainable production of timber (and state revenue). In the Central 
Provinces, traditional shifting cultivation and forest-based crop cultivation were 
banned in protected forests; the new “scientific” method of timber management 
allowed a doubling of forest revenue from Reserved and Protected Forests between 
1897 and 1908 (Baker, 1993). 
The application of scientific knowledge resulted in the ecological transformation of 
large tracts of forests in Madhya Pradesh. The implemented Working Plans and 
management practices favoured commercially valuable timber species so that 
miscellaneous forests were gradually transformed into teak and sal forests (also when 
some practices such as fire protection were found detrimental for the development of 
sal forests in eastern India [Sivaramakrishnan, 1999]). Industrial demand and 
prioritization between the 1950s and the 1970s further pronounced the ecological 
transformation of Madhya Pradesh’s forests into “timber mines” (Saxena, 2002) as 
miscellaneous forests were clear-felled to make way for 150,000 ha of teak and 
eucalyptus plantations. These state-created few-species / high-growth forests rich in 
saleable timber could offer increasingly little use value for local communities. 
Environmentalism 
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Environmental motives served for a long time as a rationale and justification for 
increased direct state control over forests. In the mid-1800s, these included concerns 
about regional climatic change, water supply and soil erosion (Rangan, 1995). 
Environmental motives for forest protection regained importance in the 1970s 
coinciding with growing international environmentalism and concern about habitat 
destruction of endangered animal and plant species. In Madhya Pradesh, 25 Wildlife 
Sanctuaries and nine National Parks were carved out from Forest Land in the wake of 
the Wild Life (Protection) Act of 1972. In the sanctuaries, traditional use rights (e.g., 
collection of minor forest produce) were further curbed; forest dwellers in National 
Parks were resettled in “eco-development villages” outside, and entry to the parks 
became restricted to the purposes of research, tourism and photography. 
Furthermore, forest protection became more environmentalist and centralized with the 
introduction of the Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980. This act nullified any state law 
that allowed the conversion of forest land to non-forest purposes. Furthermore, state 
governments were no longer authorized to de-notify Reserved Forests without prior 
central government approval, and clear-felling of “natural” forests for eucalyptus or 
teak plantations became subject to central approval in 1988. The state governments 
were also urged to act on forest “encroachments”, which led to large-scale evictions 
of people in Madhya Pradesh from Forest Land, including “orange areas” (Sarin, 
2005). The act did not only have the political implication to increase control of the 
central government at the expense of state governments; paradoxically, it also 
empowered parts of civil society, that is, environmentalists who used it as the basis of 
various Public Interest Litigations (PILs). Acting on PILs and referring to the right to 
a healthy environment derived from the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court of 
India ordered total bans on tree felling in some parts of the country.  
An increased environmentalist orientation was confirmed in the National Forest 
Policy of 1988. While the 1952 policy saw the primary function of forests in 
supporting the national industrialization strategy, the 1988 policy document defined 
environmental stability and ecological balance as the principal aims of forest 
protection. It also made first references to more participatory, decentralized and 
livelihoods-oriented models of resource management and to the need for cutting 
subsidies and liberalizing the timber trade. As such, the National Forest Policy of 
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1988 was a precursor of the decentralization and the deregulation of the 1990s and 
2000s that some of our interviewees referred to as a “paradigmatic shift” in forest 
management and control. 
DECENTRALIZATION AND PARTICIPATION IN FOREST MANAGEMENT 
New Programs and Legislation 
The policy goal of increased livelihood orientation and community participation in 
forest protection became operationalized in the Joint Forest Management (JFM) 
program. Madhya Pradesh introduced state-level JFM legislation in 1991 that 
guaranteed usufructory rights to identified villages near Reserved and Protected 
Forests in exchange for their participation in the management, protection and 
rehabilitation of local forests. Villagers in JFM areas gained, reclaimed or maintained 
access to non-timber forest products (NTFP), such as fuel wood, fodder, fruits and 
medicinal plants, to meet subsistence needs. They also received a proportion of the 
net profit made by the Forest Department from the sale of timber (100% in the case of 
timber sold from replantations made by villagers on formerly deforested land). 
Central to the JFM programme was the constitution of local-level forest user 
organizations that were to include all eligible voters of the identified village. 
Members of the JFM executive committee were to be elected, with women, landless 
households, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes adequately represented. The 
lowest-tier forest official, the Forest Guard, was to serve as the secretary of the 
committee (at least for an initial two years after which this position could go to a local 
representative). The JFM committee became responsible for patrolling the forest, for 
protecting it from fire, illegal grazing, illicit felling, encroachments and poaching, and 
for reporting any forest offences to the Forest Department. The committee, together 
with forest officers, was also in charge of preparing and implementing micro-level 
Working Plans. 
Between 1992 and 2005, more than 14,000 JFM committees were formed in Madhya 
Pradesh, and about 63% of the state’s total forest area is co-managed by JFM 
committees and the Forest Department (MPFD, 2010c). The scheme is ongoing but 
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not expanding anymore. It received external technical and financial support between 
1995 and 1999 under a large World Bank program. This program also initiated a 
Village Resource Development Project that aimed to wean communities from their 
reliance on forest resources by creating agricultural infrastructure and other income 
generating opportunities.  
Furthermore, India’s Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) (PESA) Act of 
1996, which intended to adapt India’s system of local governance (panchayati raj) to 
the particular socioeconomic and cultural conditions of “scheduled” tribal areas, had 
implications for forest governance. In particular, the act empowered tribal 
communities to manage local natural resources and it vested ownership of NTFP in 
the gram sabha (Menon & Sinha, 2003) yet within the provisions of existing law such 
as the Forest Act of 1927 or the Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980 (Singh, 2002). The 
government of Madhya Pradesh responded in 2001 to the PESA Act by moving 
decision-making powers throughout the state from elected panchayats to gram sabhas 
and their standing committees (Behar, 2001). However, state-level law remained 
unspecific about the authority of the community over natural resource management 
(Ojha, 2004). Ownership of NTFP was nominally transferred to gram sabhas, but the 
Minor Forest Produce Trading and Development Cooperative Federation (MFP-Fed), 
which is staffed with IFS officers, continued to organize the collection of major NTFP 
through its local Primary Forest Produce Cooperative Societies or, de facto, the Forest 
Guard. Now charging a “management fee”, the department distributed only the net 
incomes from the sale of NTFP to the primary cooperative societies, which in turn 
had to pay 60% to individual collectors and invest the remainder in forest 
regeneration and village infrastructure development.  
Containment, Local State Capacity and Re-territorialization 
The new initiatives described above would suggest a significant change in forest 
governance in Madhya Pradesh toward the formal devolution of authority and 
responsibility from the state-level Forest Department to village-level JFM committees 
and gram sabhas. However, the Forest Department effectively circumvented the spirit 
of the PESA Act to advance direct democracy and bring subsistence forest resources 
under the direct control of local communities. In our study villages, the Forest Guards 
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continued to control both NTFP collection and the way how money for village 
development projects was spent. While highly engaged in the panchayats, villagers 
were made to believe that the NTFP sector was fully under the jurisdiction of the 
Forest Department. Furthermore, JFM committees rarely formed locally accountable 
institutions: Forest Guards (sometimes in collusion with JFM chairpersons) tended to 
control the local committees, their meetings, accounts and appointments to the 
executive (see also Sarin et al., 2003; Vira, 2005). Finally, the JFM committees and 
the local cooperatives remained separate from the gram panchayat and the gram 
sabha, therefore creating institutional overlap and undermining the authority of 
panchayati raj institutions. Devolution of forest governance and joint forest 
management were not embedded in wider democratic decentralization processes.  
Furthermore, JFM was a bureaucratic program that only rarely resulted in true 
participation and livelihood-oriented forest management. Common villagers, 
particularly women, remained unaware of the activities of “their” JFM committee; 
micro-level Working Plans or village development schemes were not planned or 
decided upon in participatory processes. Villager participation was largely limited to 
providing information to the state (PRIA and Samarthan, 1999). The lack of wider 
community participation and consultation suggests that JFM was not even a strategy 
of containment, except for that of JFM chairpersons, perhaps. Rather, the co-
management program primarily served the relatively inexpensive implementation of 
predesigned forest development schemes, such as the afforestation of degraded lands, 
whereby livelihood needs, particularly those of women, tended to be ignored (see also 
Sarin et al., 2003). 
Regarding forest protection, the literature and our interviewees suggested that the 
community watch arrangements under JFM were quite effective in supplementing 
forest surveillance by forest officials (PRIA and Samarthan, 1999), although there had 
been a shift from rotational community patrolling toward the engagement of 
watchmen from the community (Vira, 2005). Illegal felling and NTFP collection, 
especially by people from outside the JFM villages, could often be reduced. To some 
extent, therefore, JFM led to strengthened state capacity at the local level through the 
employment of local watchmen who are considered public servants when on patrol. In 
our study villages, however, it was usually the forest officers who enforced forest-use 
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rules. In one village, for example, the watchman from a locally dominant tribal group 
did not stop cattle herders to enter the forest on a regular basis. We were not able to 
find out whether he denunciated the cattle herders (who came from a locally resented, 
non-tribal minority group) to a higher-up in the forest department who occasionally 
handed out fines to these offenders.  
JFM also implied an additional territorialization of forests. Defined territories were 
assigned to selected villages for the protection, rehabilitation and replanting of forests. 
Thereby, not only Reserved and Protected Forests but also areas classified as Village 
Forests and “orange areas” were demarcated and allocated to JFM committees. This 
re-territorialization implied that additional land came under more direct control of the 
Forest Department; in some cases, the department even attempted to convert these 
lands into Protected Forests (Sarin et al., 2003).  
This analysis indicates that (imperfect) decentralization through the JFM program did 
not result in a simple transfer of power from the state to local communities. Rather the 
contrary: state control and capacity were strengthened. But the JFM program also 
produced locality-specific political arenas where communities and state actors 
interacted in new ways. For example, the broader developmental role of Forest 
Guards beyond their traditional policing function provided a starting point for 
building more cooperative relationships between the state and villagers (PRIA and 
Samarthan, 1999). Local compromises and negotiations regarding forest-use 
restrictions also had become easier and improved the legitimacy of state-controlled 
forest management (see also Sarin et al., 2003). However, JFM did not result in the 
creation of environmental subjectivities; in fact, villagers accelerated unsustainable 
forest practices when they became deregulated, as in the case of NTFP harvesting (see 
next section). Furthermore, preexisting self-restraint collapsed in some other cases 
where independently evolved or NGO-initiated community forest management 
institutions were replaced by formal JFM committees (Sarin et al., 2003).  
Generally, the above discussion reflected some common tendencies as revealed in the 
literature and in our own field studies, but different characteristics of local 
communities, forest environments, field-level officers and the influence of external 
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agencies resulted in diverse outcomes. It is in the nature of decentralization programs 
that they produce locality-specific effects. 
Yet, devolution in forest governance also reconfigured the Forest Department. The 
department had become increasingly divided between the proponents of participatory, 
livelihoods-oriented forest management and those forest officers who favored the 
status quo or a return to the conventional state-centered “command-and-control” 
approach of forest protection. The first groups was bolstered in the late 1990s through 
the above-mentioned World Bank program, which promoted JFM but also made 
significant capital investment in the Forest Department, thus adding to its capacity. 
Some of the interviewed (mid-rank) forest officers, however, lamented the lack of a 
coherent vision and initiative from the highest ranks in their department after the 
discontinuation of the World Bank project in 1999: No common long-term strategy 
would have evolved because officers spend little time just before their retirement in 
the top post of the state’s forest bureaucracy and because the nomination into this post 
is determined based on seniority and not performance, ability or persuasion. Indeed, 
the shift toward more participatory forest governance slowed down after the World 
Bank project ceased. (The project’s second phase was not granted partly because of 
protests of mass adivasi organizations against growing (misuse of) power by the 
Forest Department.) After that, the Forest Department also moved back from the 
cooperation with civil society organization, which had been involved in the 
implementation of JFM and in a more general dialogue on forest policy. 
Wider Implications 
Official forest surveys based on satellite imaginary and ground-truthing suggested that 
forest cover and density had increased in Madhya Pradesh’s JFM areas, particularly in 
previously degraded forests and in the early period of the program. This had helped 
offsetting forest loss due to encroachments in other areas, illegal felling, submergence 
alongside the Narmada and other dams, and mining activities (FSI, 1991-2009). 
Interviewed officials and development workers having first-hand experience of 
particular localities (but not all respondents in our studied villages) confirmed this 
assessment: forest replanting, rehabilitation and protection under JFM would have 
resulted in a slight (re-) generation of (secondary) forests in Madhya Pradesh. 
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In contrast, the Forest Department’s attention to livelihood issues remained largely 
rhetorical; most new micro-level Working Plans, designed de facto by Divisional 
Forest Officers, continued to focus on the production of forests with high-standing 
timber trees and dense canopy cover. There was only a slow and patchy shift toward 
the production of more diverse and local-user-oriented forests, often depending on the 
attitude of local forest officers. Furthermore, the practice of rotational coupes, 
whereby timber trees were cut only every 10-15 years in a particular JFM area, was 
not in sync with regular or emergency livelihood needs. This points to a conceptual 
problem of reconciling Working Plans with local needs. Moreover, forest cover and 
canopy density continued to form the sole bases of the official monitoring system; 
other qualitative ecological attributes and livelihood values of forests were not 
assessed systematically. 
Concrete livelihood impacts of JFM were therefore difficult to gauge and they 
differed between and within villages. As only 14,000 out of more than 22,000 forest-
near villages were included in the JFM program, many people in non-JFM villages 
became excluded from their traditional access to forest resources leading to inter-
village inequality, and in some cases conflict (Sarin et al., 2003). In JFM areas, 
furthermore, some of our interviewees stated that in their project villages, the (re-) 
generation of forests helped improving the local availability of fuel wood and fodder 
(from lopped tree branches). In other parts, by contrast, an increased canopy density 
reduced the availability of grasses for fodder which in turn shifted pressure to public 
grazing lands (TERI 2003). 
JFM also led to intra-village inequalities and conflicts. The program tended to 
consolidate the power of existing village elites who were disproportionally nominated 
into executive committee positions even where they did not form the most forest-
dependent group. It has been reported that unaccountable JFM committees failed to 
distribute the net profits from the sale of timber and MFPs (equally) among 
community members (Sarin et al., 2003). In our study villages, people were generally 
unaware of any resource transfers through JFM; village development projects were 
seen as funded through the Forest Department’s own kitty; some projects (e.g., check 
dams) only existed on paper. Also, marginalized groups within the village, such as 
women or non-dominant caste groups who were excluded from the JFM decision-
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making process, bore the majority of the costs of forest protection (i.e., income loss 
due to restrictions on particular uses such as the collection of bamboo shoots or the 
keeping of goats) (Sarin et al., 2003). 
Yet villagers explained to us that they benefitted from casual wage labor offered by 
the Forest Department for replanting, forest protection and timber harvesting. Demand 
for the first two categories of work increased sharply under JFM. This was also 
reflected in growing expenditures of the Forest Department on casual wage 
employment (according to a forest official this figure had reached Rs. 48m (c. US$ 
1m) in the mid-2000s from only Rs. 12m a few years earlier). 
Furthermore, the state’s objective to “wean” local communities from forest resources 
seemed to be increasingly realized. Our village studies revealed that reliance on 
income from forest products steadily declined in recent years because of both new 
non-forest income opportunities and decreased availability and access to forest 
resources. Earnings from seasonal migration, local agricultural wage employment and 
owner cultivation increased significantly as the studied forest-near villages in Betul 
and Shahdol districts experienced agricultural expansion and intensification, which 
has been propelled by the above-mentioned JFM Village Resource Development 
program as well as other public and private investments. 
DEREGULATION AND REREGULATION OF THE FOREST SECTOR 
New Policies and Initiatives 
In tune with India’s accelerating economic liberalization policies since 1991, gradual 
and partial deregulation and reregulation of Madhya Pradesh’s forest sector started in 
the mid-1990s. In the context of the above-mentioned World Bank project, the state 
reformed its nistar policies in 1995, for instance. Nistar denominates concessional 
rights to forest products, such as small timber, fuel wood and bamboo. Populist 
politics had extended these traditional rights to the whole population so that each rural 
and urban household had become entitled to purchase a limited quantity of these 
products at a concessional rate. Nistar products were thus offered at government-run 
depots across the state. The new policy limited these nistar rights to forest-near 
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villages, which also played a role in forest protection and rehabilitation (see previous 
section), while residents of villages and towns that were farther away from forests 
than 5 km had to buy these products at the higher market rate. In the beginning, the 
new nistar policy drew much criticism; opponents argued that it implied the 
commoditization of a subsistence right. 
The World Bank project also advocated the abolition of material-supply subsidies to 
the wood-processing industries that had been introduced in the 1950s and 1960s to 
promote (import substitution) industrialization. In particular, pulp and paper mills 
benefited from the subsidized supply of bamboo and eucalyptus while artisans (e.g., 
bamboo weavers) had to pay full market rates for the relatively scarce raw materials. 
After the elimination of these subsidies, private industries increasingly purchased 
softwood from Africa, Southeast Asia and North America; a few of them also started 
raising their own tree plantations. These economic strategies were facilitated by other 
policies of liberalization: the lift of import restrictions on wood products in 1992, the 
subsequent decrease in import tariffs, and the loosening of land ceiling regulations for 
the purpose of private forestry. The Lok Vaniki programme starting in 1999 further 
aimed to promote forestry on private land through extension services, financial 
incentives and streamlined and decentralized procedures to fell and market timber 
trees. Despite these steps toward privatization, however, the Forest Department and 
the State Forest Corporation continued to predominate in the production of timber, 
and the department kept its monopoly on the marketing of wood in Madhya Pradesh. 
Policy changes in the non-timber sector affected protected areas more directly. 
Generally, the Forest Department began to pay more attention to low-volume, high-
value NTFP, particularly medicinal and aromatic plants, through which forest 
productivity could be enhanced at a time when policies gradually shifted from 
extractive to selective timber felling. Policymakers recognized that Madhya Pradesh 
had the potential to benefit from growing domestic and global demand in medicinal 
plants, and the promotion of NTFP was also in accordance with the official 
reorientation of forest policy toward livelihood needs, as it were primarily poorer 
social groups (including adivasi) who collected these products. 
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In 2003, Madhya Pradesh abolished the royalties and mandatory transit permits for 
non-nationalized NTFP with the stated objective to improve the economic situation 
and freedom of the mostly adivasi forest collectors through an improved, unhindered 
flow of NTFP from the forests to the market. Since then, non-nationalized NTFP have 
no longer been inspected and recorded at the roadside checkpoints of the Forest 
Department. By the same government order, which was part of the Bhopal 
Declaration adopted by the state government and implemented by the Department of 
SC/ST Welfare, the trading of five NTFP was de-nationalized (i.e., the tree fruit harra 
and four types of tree gum), leaving only the three NTFP regulated by the state (i.e., 
tendu (beedi) leaves, sal seeds and gums from the kullu tree). The nationalized NTFP 
had to be traded under the monopoly system of MFP-Fed. Villagers, who are 
automatically members of the local Primary Forest Produce Cooperative Societies, 
were to collect nationalized NTFP, tendu being the by far most important one, in 
defined seasons and they were to receive a fixed price from the cooperative or state-
appointed traders. De-nationalized NTFP were no longer subject to any of these 
restrictions.  
The MFP-Fed diversified, if not shifted, its role from engaging directly in the 
collection and marketing of unprocessed, nationalized NTFP toward facilitating the 
development and trading of diverse NTFP-based products. For instance, the federation 
opened in 2002 a Processing and Research Centre (PARC) for (forest-grown) 
medicinal and aromatic plants. This centre set up a state-of-the-art laboratory with 
equipment imported from the US to measure active ingredients of medicinal plants. 
Lab tests were also offered to private parties against payment. The aim was to 
implement quality control and standardization to facilitate domestic and international 
marketing of NTFP from Madhya Pradesh. During our visit we were also told that 
PARC intended to develop an online marketing platform for buyers and sellers and to 
provide information on global market opportunities. While much of its thrust was on 
facilitating the development of new (international) markets, the centre had also started 
to promote processing and value addition at the level of the primary cooperatives as 
well as to produce and market its own brand of herbal products. 
Another initiative that was relevant for Madhya Pradesh’s NTFP sector and protected 
forest areas came from the central Ministry of Health acting on recommendations of 
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the Planning Commission in Delhi. In 2003, the National Medicinal Plants Board 
started the Contract Farming Scheme for medicinal plants in order to ensure the 
pharmaceutical industry raw material supplies in adequate quality and uniformity. 
Another stated objective was to protect the wild stocks of valuable NTFP by releasing 
ecological pressure through their cultivation and ex-situ conservation on agricultural 
fields. Under the scheme, commercial growers received a government subsidy for the 
first three years of cultivating (originally forest-based) medicinal plants on arable 
private or common land. Subsidy recipients were expected to have a buy-back 
guarantee from an industrial buyer. The by far largest share of central subsidies under 
this scheme was allocated in Madhya Pradesh, particularly in the forest-far, industrial 
region around Indore, and for the cultivation of safed musli, a valuable tuber used as a 
tonic. The other supported NTFP with some significance in Madhya Pradesh was 
amla, a medium-sized tree producing antioxidant fruits rich in vitamin C that are used 
in medicinal and cosmetic products. 
Ceding, Refocusing and Rescaling State Control 
Liberalization and deregulation of protected forest areas in Madhya Pradesh were 
fairly limited. For instance, the state continued to finance forest protection at similar 
levels. Neither was there a transfer of formal authority over Forest Land from the 
Forest Department to private economic actors. However, the state modified, and in 
some cases even ceded, its control of particular forest resources and their collection, 
trading and distribution. 
In the timber sector, the state maintained its monopoly on the production and sale of 
wood from protected forests while increasingly encouraging forest development 
elsewhere. However, it retreated from the role as provider of subsidized forest goods. 
This generally allowed the Forest Department to refocus on its core mandate of 
environmental protection. In the case of nistar, rights became benefits linked to forest 
protection. The elimination of wood subsidies, furthermore, increased state revenue 
from Reserved and Protected Forests and facilitated the declared shift toward less 
extractive timber harvesting. At the same time, the industry was enabled to provide 
for itself through imports and incentive schemes to grow their own tree plantations – 
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which, in turn, contributed modestly to the goal of the Forest Department to increase 
forest cover in the state.  
The ceding of direct state power over non-timber resources in protected forests was 
more substantial than that of timber. In particular, the abolition of the transit-pass 
system and the de-nationalization of NTFP decreased state control over valuable 
forest resources. Private traders could move any amount of non-nationalized NTFP at 
any time of the year out of Madhya Pradesh’s forests. As traded quantities were no 
longer recorded at road checkpoints, the Forest Department had lost any (indicative) 
knowledge of natural forest stocks and potential unseasonal (over-) harvesting. This 
signified a loss of biopower that could have been useful for promoting more 
sustainable NTFP management (see below). However, state control over the 
collection and marketing of NTFP had always been imperfect. Much more easily than 
timber logs, smugglers had been able to hide the small NTFP from the eyes of 
officials at checkpoints. Furthermore, the transit-pass system, as well as nationalized 
NTFP trading, had been highly corruptible and nexuses between local elites and 
representatives of primary cooperatives, traders and forest officials had often existed 
(Fehr, 2007). Thus, deregulation did not lead to a simple transfer of power from state 
officers to private traders (or collectors). Furthermore, denationalization concerned 
NTFP with declining market demand and was probably as much a cost-saving 
strategy as an attempt to empower forest collectors. 
But the state did not fully retreat from the NTFP sector; partial deregulation was soon 
followed by the reregulation of NTFP production and marketing, particularly for 
commercially valuable and exportable species. Through projects such as PARC or the 
Contract Farming Scheme, the state tried to promote the protection and sustainable 
production of medicinal plants (as well as the development of an industry with export 
potential). In contrast to previous regulation, this was done by creating economic 
incentives rather than by imposing restrictions. Interestingly, the new state regulation 
of valuable medicinal plants was also not brought to bear in the forests, but in 
agricultural fields near Indore and through laboratories in Bhopal. State control was 
de-territorialized, relocated and rescaled, yet not always with the intended impact in 
the protected areas (see below).  
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Generally, state intervention in Madhya Pradesh’s forest sector began to become more 
oriented toward markets and economic effectiveness. Furthermore, commoditization 
of nature was attempted through the promotion of eco-tourism in National Parks. One 
officer of the Department of Finance, reflecting an increasingly economistic discourse 
pervading the public sector, suggested that Madhya Pradesh should be compensated 
financially by the central government for providing environmental services beyond its 
state borders thanks to the protection of forests. One of the former heads of the Forest 
Department, furthermore, was in favor of further deregulation and privatization as his 
instructions would not reach the Forest Guards anyways or only in an altered way. 
However, these views were not commonly shared within the department. Another 
high-ranking officer, for example, criticized the partial ceding and de-territorialization 
of state control: “The forester’s [forest officer’s] primary job should be in the forest.” 
Similar to the viewpoints on the role of participation in forestry, these internal 
divisions weakened the Forest Department; in particular, they hindered the 
development of a common strategy for a more effective reregulation of the NTFP 
sector. Furthermore, many lower-ranking forest officers felt that JFM was misguided 
and that adivasi forest collectors would deplete NTFP due to their ignorance of the 
value of environmental conservation. Among these ranks, a return to more direct state 
control and restoration of their past authority was a common desire.  
Wider Implications 
Unlike the hardly deregulated timber sector, the partial deregulation and reregulation 
of the NTFP sector had significant environmental and socioeconomic effects. The 
availability of commercially valuable NTFP in Madhya Pradesh had declined over 
many decades, particularly in the case of some minor non-nationalized plants. This 
indicates that the previous territorialized control through the transit pass system had 
not been very effective to prevent resource depletion. However, the freed up flow of 
valuable species after the abolishment of transit passes – together with increased 
market demand for “natural” health products and improved road infrastructure – 
accelerated degradation. The costs of trading NTFP fell as trader licenses, transit 
passes and bribes no longer had to be paid. Consequently, the number of traders 
increased and they travelled to more and more remote villages as a result of 
competition for supply. Local institutions, such as primary cooperatives, JFM 
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committees and gram sabhas, generally made no attempts to regulate access to NTFP 
from protected forests so that unsustainable harvesting practices and overuse of 
particular plant species followed the rise of market demand (Fehr and Véron, 2007). 
By contrast, denationalization had little environmental impact as it concerned 
primarily NTFP with declining market demand. 
The de-territorialized reregulation of the NTFP sector, such as through the promoted 
field cultivation of medicinal plants, failed equally to conserve and rehabilitate 
commercially valuable species in protected forest areas. Amla production outside the 
forests remained limited and did not relieve pressure on the forest trees, which were 
often harvested unsustainably by cutting of full branches to access the fruits. By 
contrast, the (state-supported) cultivation of safed musli in agricultural fields picked 
up rapidly and substantially. Rather than releasing ecological pressure on the wild 
stock, however, it resulted in a nearly total disappearance of this medicinal plant from 
protected forest areas in Betul district, for example. Because safed musli propagules 
were not available in nurseries, young wet tubers were taken in large quantities from 
the forests – beyond the regenerative capacity of the resource.  
The livelihood impact of continued NTFP depletion was generally offset by new 
economic opportunities created by agricultural expansion and intensification in forest-
near regions (see previous section). Except for nationalized tendu leaves, NTFP 
collection became an activity of last resort, particularly during the lean season. As 
such, it remained important for vulnerability reduction among the poorest villagers. 
However, women and older people were no longer able to engage in gathering some 
of the scarcest NTFP as distances and time necessary to find these had increased with 
depletion. 
Furthermore, the partial denationalization of NTFP and the elimination of royalties 
had little economic impact on forest collectors. Denationalization concerned only few 
minor NTFP; the cost-savings from the elimination of NTFP royalties were not passed 
down to the collectors. Traders continued to fix the purchase price of non-nationalized 
NTFP among themselves, thus creating a monopsony-like situation whereby 
collectors received low prices.  
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Finally, the increased cultivation of medicinal plants in agricultural fields reinforced 
the spatial separation of livelihoods and forests: Livelihood opportunities shifted from 
poor, mostly adivasi and female collectors in forest-near areas to better-off, mostly 
male and non-adivasi cultivators farther away from forests. However, the cultivation 
of medicinal and aromatic plants implied high risks; commercial growers of safed 
musli and lemon grass in Madhya Pradesh, for example, ran big losses when sudden 
oversupplies – domestic and from China, respectively –had brought prices to collapse. 
The de-territorialized reregulation through contract farming and increased market 
information generally failed to protect growers from volatile (global) markets. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The combination of elements of political geography and political ecology proved 
valuable for the study of protected areas. Political-geographic concepts of different 
forms of state power, such as territoriality, biopower or governmentality, can usefully 
complement political ecology approaches that tend to be more limited to investigating 
power inequalities with reference to political-economic theories. In turn, the insight 
from political ecology that environmental dynamics can act themselves as a force of 
power or territorialization (e.g., NTFP degradation contributing to spatial separation 
of forests and people) adds to political-geographical conceptualizations that usually 
do not regard the environment as an agent. 
Empirically, the paper showed that contemporary forest protection in Madhya Pradesh 
(and probably elsewhere in the developing world) included elements of conventional 
conservation methods based on territorial state control and biopower and of more 
novel instruments based on community involvement, market orientation and 
reregulation. Clearly, decentralization and liberalization of forest protection remained 
imperfect and partial, and contradictions with conventional conservation strategies 
emerged. For example, the PESA Act devolving forest resource ownership and 
management was at odds with the Forest (Conservation) Act strengthening central 
control over forests. Different interpretations of the law and diverging standpoints 
regarding community participation and regarding privatization also contributed to 
exacerbated frictions between different state and non-state actors and even within the 
forest bureaucracy. 
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Indeed, the emerging “mixed” approach of forest protection in Madhya Pradesh was 
not a well-designed, coherent conservation strategy. Rather, it represented a 
concoction of individual laws, directives, initiatives and programs originating from 
and executed by different state agencies, NGOs and international donors. Apart from 
measures taken in connection with the World Bank project perhaps, different state 
interventions into forest governance in Madhya Pradesh were conceived separately 
and remained largely uncoordinated. For instance, local level institutions were not 
encouraged to step in when the state retreated from the regulation of most NTFP. Or, 
JFM committees were not supported to become institutional beneficiaries of the 
Contract Farming Scheme for medicinal plants. For the most part, therefore, 
decentralization and liberalization of forest protection did not interconnect; 
contradictions were not preempted and potential synergies were not utilized. 
Our research shows that (imperfect) decentralization and (partial) liberalization of 
forest protection in Madhya Pradesh did not result in a simple or significant loss of 
state control over protected areas. For instance, the Forest Department largely 
maintained territorial control over Forest Land and the timber sector. The greatest 
challenge to the (territorial) power of the Forest Department probably came from 
Supreme Court orders based on the Forest (Conservation) Act and related public 
interest litigations initiated by environmentalist groups. (This might have changed 
after the enactment of the landmark Forest Dwellers Act in 2007 that recognizes land 
rights of traditional forest settlers who have resided on Forest Land since 1930 or 
longer, thus challenging state ownership of some Reserved and Protected Forests.) 
Also, the loss of territorial and biopower over NTFP and their ineffective reregulation 
were relatively inconsequential because the department’s control over that sector had 
already been highly imperfect and because the monopoly over the most steadily 
profitable product (tendu leaves) was retained.  
Indeed, one might even argue that the Forest Department was able to strengthen its 
power over forest conservation (yet in a modified way). For instance, JFM helped 
strengthen local state capacity through community involvement or the employment of 
paid local watchmen, respectively. This was enabled by the World Bank project, 
which also invested heavily in staff training and physical infrastructure of the forest 
bureaucracy. To some extent, JFM implied a shift from coercive policing toward a 
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more effective, persuasive and locally legitimate form of power – however, through 
containment of the elites rather than through democratic participation. Moreover, the 
Forest Department was able to retreat from unprofitable activities, such as industrial 
wood subsidization, nistar or control of minor NTFP. This permitted the forest 
bureaucracy to better focus on its core business and concern: environmental 
protection, timber production and expansion of forest cover.  
It is difficult to gauge the overall environmental implications of the recent political-
economic reforms in forest conservation because decentralization and liberalization 
cannot be isolated from other (interrelated) causes of forest degradation or 
regeneration. Furthermore, only forest cover and canopy density were systematically 
monitored. Yet, there were only slight fluctuations in forest cover after the beginning 
of forest governance reform in Madhya Pradesh in the early 1990s; the possibly 
positive net effects of the JFM program and private farm forestry were 
counterbalanced by other processes. Qualitative data, however, suggest that the 
depletion of valuable NTFP in protected forests accelerated in this period, mostly 
because of growing market demand for medicinal plants that coincided with 
ineffective reregulation of the sector, population pressure and increased consumerism 
and need for cash within tribal society. As a consequence of NTFP depletion, 
protected forests became less attractive for local communities facilitating the further 
separation of forests and livelihoods, a process that had been supported since colonial 
times. This also made it easier for the state to keep people out of Reserved and 
Protected Forests and to move closer to the imagined ideal of an unpopulated 
forestscape with high-standing trees, maximum wood mass and dense canopy. Apart 
from ecological change in the forests, agricultural intensification in forest-near 
regions aided the weaning of local communities from forest resources.  
In terms of policy, this study points to the importance of coordinating (decentralizing 
and liberalizing) state interventions and of strengthening the capabilities of local 
institutions, particularly to reregulate the NTFP sector. Given the continued 
dominance of the Forest Department in Madhya Pradesh’s forest sector, 
administrative reform and retraining will be required so that the rhetoric of livelihoods 
orientation can become reality and synergies between strengthening various 
environmental services of forests and meeting economic needs can be found.  
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ENDNOTES 
1 The Central Provinces covered a large part of today’s Madhya Pradesh and 
Chhattisgarh, as well as smaller parts of Maharashtra, Gujarat and Rajasthan. 
Particularly the northern parts of Madhya Pradesh were ruled by a large number of 
small princely states. Historical data on the parts of Madhya Pradesh that were under 
indirect British rule are less easily accessible than information on the Central 
Provinces. Madhya Pradesh was bifurcated in 2000, when the state of Chhattisgarh 
was formed. 
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